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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-v.-
ROYDON K. McCULLOUGH, dba 
ROYDON K. McCULLOUGH CO., 
Defendant and Appellant, 
-v.-
HENRY L. ASHTON, et al., 
Third-party Defendants, 
and respondents, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
No. 8298 
Plaintiff brought this action. contending a breach of 
contract on the part of defendant. The facts are as follows: 
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract 
on November 2, 1949, wherein, defendant for a stipulated 
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sum agreed to construct a theater building for plaintiff. (See 
Exh. P-1,) On April13, 1950, defendant turned said theater 
building over to plaintiff and plaintiff took possession of 
the same and commenced his theater operation. (R 835, 
R 322). Said building contract provides that final pay-
ment shall be made, "ten days after substantial completion 
of the work provided the work be then fully completed and 
the Contract fully performed." (P-1) Final payment was 
made by plaintiff at the time of taking possession of the 
building by plaintiff issuing to defendant a promissory note 
for $1,000.00, the final balance owing on said contract, and 
which note was finally paid in full by plaintiff to defendant 
personally on March 1, 1951. (R 837) 
Approximately the first part of January 1950, prior to 
plaintiff taking possession of said building, there arose 
some differences with reference to the construction of said 
building and as a result plaintiff and defendant and defend-
ant's subcontractor Henry L. Ashton entered into a separate 
agreement ( P -5), wherein it was agreed that defendant and 
his subcontractor would "thoroughly point up and fill all rna· 
sonry joints in the exterior of the hollow block masonry 
work," of said building and "would paint the exterior walls 
with a heavy coat of lead and oil paint." This work was to 
be done in full compensation for the failure of defendant and 
his subcontractor to install certain items of steel, in the 
hollow block pilasters and walls, in a satisfactory manner, 
also for their failure to fill pilaster cores with cement mor· 
tar and "to completely bed vertical block joints." (P-5) Sub· 
sequent to the signing of said agreement of January 7, 1950, 
defendant and his subcontractor proceeded with the con· 
struction work. Plaintiff visited the premises on an average 
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of twice a day, inspected the work, and when it came time 
to do the painting of the exterior walls plaintiff selected 
the color of the paint to be used and was present when at 
least part of the wall was being painted. Plaintiff at no 
time complained or objected to the way in which the paint 
was applied or that the joints had not properly filled or tooled 
according to the agreement of January 7, 1950. ( R 340, 
341,342,345,1291,1292,282, 308) 
Further, on the 19th of April 1951, plaintiff requested 
defendant to submit a bid on an additional portion of the 
building. At that time plaintiff had been in possession of 
the building over one year, however, plaintiff made no 
objection at that time with reference to the construction of 
the original building. ( R 334, 341.) 
The defendant sublet a portion of the construction of 
said building. On November 3, 1949, defendant entered 
into a subcontract agreement with Henry L. Ashton, that pur-
suant thereto, Henry L. Ashton agreed to do the masonry 
work for said building in accordance with the plans and 
specifications of the original contract entered into between 
plaintiff and defendant. (R 162-156 incl.) That on or 
about November 3, 1949, defendant entered into a subcon-
tract agreement with William A. Earl and William A. Earl 
Jr. dba, William A. Earl and Son, plastering contractors, 
whereby William A. Earl and William A. Earl Jr. agreed to 
do the lathing and plastering in said building in accordance 
with the plans and specifications of the original contract be-
tween plaintiff and defendant. (R 83, 151) 
On December 3, 1951, Plaintiff filed in the Third Dis-
trict Court for Salt Lake County a complaint, wherein he al-
leged that defendant had failed to fulfill said contract and 
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complete construction of said building and that the portions 
that were erected were erected in an unskillful and negligent 
manner and of unsuitable and inferior materials. (R 1-57). 
The action in the lower court was tried upon plaintiff's sec-
ond amended complaint filed April14, 1953. (R 109-112) 
Defendant in his answer denied that he had failed to fulfill 
said contract in the manner set forth in plaintiff's complaint 
and in addition thereto set forth the following defenses: 
"That on or about April 13, 1950, said building 
was completed, or substantially completed, according 
to said contract, a copy of said contract being attached 
to plaintiff's complaint as Exhibit 'A'. That on said 
date, to-wit, April 13, 1950, plaintiff accepted said 
building as complete and full performance by defend-
ant of said contract. 
"The Plaintiff failed within a reasonable time 
after acceptance of said building to assert any defects, 
or failure on the part of defendant to complete said 
building or comply with the provisions of said contract; 
therefore, plaintiff is now barred on the ground of 
laches from asserting such defects, or failure on the 
part of defendant to complete said building or to 
comply with the provisions of said contract. 
"That on January 7, 1950, plaintiff and defend-
ant entered into an agreement, a copy of which is at· 
tached hereto as Exhibit III and made a part of these 
pleadings, whereby plaintiff asserted the defects in said 
building which he alleged did not comply with said orig· 
inal contract; and the said agreement of January 7, 
1950, was entered into as a novation of said original 
contract, and as accord and satisfaction of said original 
contract. 
"(a) That pursuant to said agreement of Janu· 
ary 7, 1950, defendant agreed to perform additional 
work not specified or required under said original con· 
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fects in said building. 
"(b) That the additional work specified in said 
agreement of January 7, 1950, was completed in a 
satisfactory manner and accepted by plaintiff as a com-
plete discharge of defendant's obligations to plaintiff 
under said contracts. 
"That plaintiff has waived any defects, faulty ma-
terial or workmanship in said building and is therefore 
estopped from making any claim for damages by reason 
thereof from defendant." 
(R 63-66 incl., 116, 117, 118, 170) 
Defendant also moved the court to allow him to bring 
in as third party defendants the subcontractor who did the 
masonry work, and furnished the building stone and cinder 
block, Henry L. Ashton, and the subcontractor on the lathing 
and plastering, William A. Earl and William A. Earl Jr. 
The court granted defendants' motion and these additional 
parties were joined as third party defendants. ( R 119) 
Defendant alleged in his third party complaint that Plain-
tiff was suing him for breach of the original contract, in-
corporated plaintiffs complaint as a part of his own com-
plaint, alleged that third party defendants, as subcontractors, 
agreed to construct a portion of said building and to do so 
in accordance with the plans and specifications of the orig-
inal contract between plaintiff and defendant, and prayed 
that if the. court found for plaintiff on any portion of the 
construction work which the subcontractors had agreed to 
perform, then and in such case defendant have judgment 
against said subcontractors in the same amount as plaintiff 
was awarded judgment. Third party defendant William A. 
Earl and William A. Earl Jr. answered and denied that their 
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work was done in an unskillful or negligent manner and 
further denied that unsuitable or inferior materials were 
used by them in the construction. Further they set forth as 
a specific defense the following: 
"These answering Third Party Defendants allege 
that the lathing and plastering work performed by them 
was accepted by the Third Party Plaintiff, and Third 
Party Plaintiff made no objection thereto and made 
payment therefor in full to these answering Third Party 
Defendants, and by reason thereof the Third Party Plain· 
itff has waived, and is therefore estopped from making, 
any claim for damages against these Third Party De· 
fendants." 
(R 151, 152) 
Third Party Defendant Henry L. Ashton answered and 
denied that his work was done in an unskillful or negligent 
manner and denied that inferior or unsuitable materials were 
used by him in the construction. Further he set forth as a 
specific and affirmative defense the following: 
"Further answering said third-party amended com· 
plaint defendant, Henry L. Ashton, alleges that on or 
about the 7th day of January, 1950, at the request of 
the Plaintiff, Alvie Peterson, and Roydon K. McCul· 
Iough, defendant, he agreed to undertake the expense 
of doing extra work as set out in Exhibit 3 attached to 
defendant's answer to plaintiff's second amended com· 
plaint: that in accordance with said Agreement said 
extra work was done as agreed and in an acceptable 
manner to both plaintiff, Alvie Peterson and defendant, 
Roydon K. McCullough; that the expense of said work 
was undertaken by the defendant, Henry L. Ashton, 
above and beyond the responsibility created by reason 
of his contract with Roydon K. McCullough as set out 
in Exhibit 2 herein referred to, and was undertaken by 
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the defendant, Henry L. Ashton, for the express purpose 
of satisfying both plaintiff, Alvie Peterson and defend-
ant, Roydon K. McCullough, and did in fact so satisfy 
both of said parties." 
(R 163, 164, 165) 
The case was heard before the Honorable Joseph L. Nel-
son sitting as the judge and the trier of fact. At the con-
clusion of the evidence a motion was made by Third Party 
Defendant Buehner Cinder Block Co., that as to them the 
action be dismissed. The court at that time stated: (R 1100) 
"THE COURT: Taking up the motions in the order 
they were presented to the Court, it will be the order of the 
Court and the ruling of the Court that the motion of Buehner 
Cinder Block Company, A Utah Corporation, to dismiss the 
action or dismiss the complaint of Roydon K. McCullough 
against said corporation be and the same is granted. 
"It is the order of the Court and the ruling of the Court, 
that the motion now before the Court of William Earl and 
William Earl, Jr., known also as William A. Earl and Son, 
Plastering Contractors, to dismiss the action as to them of the 
defendant Roydon K. McCullough, be and the same is de-
nied. 
"It will be the order of the Court and the ruling of the 
Court, that the motion of Henry L. Ashton, defendant herein, 
to dismiss the action as to him of Roydon K. McCullough, 
he and the same is denied. 
"(Discussion by Mr. Boyer, relative to the presenting 
of oral arguments, at this time.) 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: The final judgment on all the 
claims will be entered at one time? 
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"THE COURT: Yes, but I am granting the motion 
of the Buehner Block Company, at this time. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: We don't want appeal time to 
run on one and not the others. 
"THE COURT: It may be entered all as the same time. 
"MR. NELSON: No objection. 
"THE COURT: The Court will be in recess." 
On the 4th of August 1954, the court filed a Memoran· 
dum decision wherein he held that Plaintiff should have 
judgment against defendant as follows: (R 166-180) 
"For damages arising by reason of defective material 
and work done in roofing building; damage to drapes, wood-
work, equipment, decorations, etc.-$1,000.00. 
"Expense and cost to ~epair roof or re-roof build-
Ing. $1,500.00 
"For use of building stone and cinder block 
different than that provided by contract, lack of 
mortar in masonry work, and defective plaster re-
quiring re-plastering of building. $6,300.00 
"For repairs to cement floors. $ 300.00 
"For loss of revenue during time building will 
be under repair. $ 357.66 
"For removal, storage and replacement of 
equipment. $ 350.00 
"Total Judgment. $9,807.66." 
As to Third Party Defendants Henry L. Ashton, the 
masonry subcontractor, and who furnished the building stone 
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and cinder block, the court held that Defendant and Third 
Party Plaintiff Roydon K. McCullough had no cause of 
action. As to William A. Earl and William A. Earl Jr., dba, 
William A. Earl and Son, plastering contractors, the court 
also held that Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, Roydon 
K. McCullough, had no cause of action. The Court directed 
that the prevailing parties prepare findings, conclusions . and 
decree in accordance with his memorandum decision. 
Findings, conclusions and judgment were submitted for 
the Earls, the plaster subcontractor, and without notice to 
Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, either by the court or 
by the attorney for the Earls, and absolutely contrary to the 
express order of the court that judgment would he entered 
on all the claims at the same time as hereinabove set forth, 
and without setting forth any reason, the Court signed 
said judgment, and the same was filed of record August 12, 
1954. The Court found in its conclusion the following: 
"That Third Party Plaintiff, Roydon K. McCul-
lough, has waived any claim he may have against Third 
Party Defendants, William A. Earl and William A. 
Earl, Jr., on account of lathing and plastering by said 
Third Party Defendants in connection with said theatre 
building. That the Third Party Defendants, William 
A. Earl and William A. Earl, Jr., doing business as 
William Earl and Son, Plastering Contractors, are en-
titled to a judgment against the Third Party Plaintiff, 
Roydon K. McCullough, for no cause of action and for 
costs incurred herein." 
In the Findings of Fact the Court found the following: 
"That the lathing and plastering work in con-
nection with the construction of said theatre building, 
as performed by said Third Party Defendants, Wil-
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liam A. Earl and William A. Earl, Jr., was by Third 
Party Plaintiff, Roydon K. McCullough, accepted and 
approved and said Third Party Plaintiff made no ob-
jection the~eto and paid for the same." 
(R 183-186) 
On October 4, 1954 plaintiff submitted findings, con· 
elusions, and judgment, and so advised defendant. At that 
time defendant was advised for the first time, that the court 
had signed the Earl's judgment, contrary to the express order 
and ruling of the court. Defendant on Oct. 7, 1954 filed 
with the court a motion objecting to the court signing the 
judgment of plaintiff and moving the court to vacate the 
judgment of the Third Party Defendant Earls' until judg· 
ment could he entered upon all of the claims at the same 
time. At the time defendant submitted this motion the find-
ings, conclusions and judgment of Third Party Defendant 
Ashton and Buehner Cinder Block company had not even 
been submitted to the court. On October 6, 1954 the court 
signed plaintiff's judgment and the same was filed of record 
October 7, 1954. (R 187, 188, 189-195) 
On October 13, 1954, defendant and Third Party Plain-
tiff filed with the court a motion for a new trial as to all 
of the parties and as to all of the issues. (Rl96) 
On October 29, 1954, defendant filed with the court 
another motion to vacate the findings, conclusions and judg· 
ment of Plaintiff Peterson, signed on the 6th of October, 
1954. ( R 198-200) 
On the 9th of N ovemher, 1954, hearing was had upon 
defendant's and Third Party Plaintiff's foregoing motions 
and on the 12th day of November 1954, the Court signed 
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an order denying the motion to set aside the findings, con-
clusions, and judgments of Plaintiff Peterson and Third 
Party Defendant Earl, also denying the motion for a new 
trial, and giving Third Party Defendant Ashton until Novem-
ber 19, 1954 to file findings, conclusions, and judgment, 
otherwise defendant could do it for him. The plaintiff's 
judgment was also corrected to the total amount of $9,571.26. 
Said order of the court was filed of record November 16, 
1954. (R-201-203) 
On November 26, 1954, the court filed of record the 
findings, conclusions, and judgment of Third Party Defendant 
Henry L. Ashton. In the findings the court stated: 
"That the masonry work in connection with the 
construction of said theater and the materials used in 
connection therewith by the Third Party Defendant, 
Henry L. Ashton, was accepted and approved by the 
Third Party Plaintiff, Roydon K. McCullough and said 
Third Party Plaintiff made no objection thereto and ac-
cepted the responsibility thereof." 
In the conclusions the court stated: 
"That Third Party Plaintiff, Roydon K. McCul-
lough, has waived any claim he may have against Third 
Party Defendant, Henry L. Ashton, on account of 
masonry work performed and materials supplied by said 
Third Party Defendant in connection with the said the-
ater building." 
(R 205-210) 
Notice of Appeal was filed December 8, 1954, by de-
fendant and Third Party Plaintiff, appealing from the judg-
ments and orders of the court. (R 211-212) On December 
13, 1954, the court filed of record the findings, conclusions, 
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and judgment of Third Party Defendant, Buehner Cinder 
Block Company. (R 213, 218) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT USED A BUILDING STONE AND CINDER 
BLOCK DIFFERENT THAN THAT PROVIDED BY THE 
CONTRACT, FURTHER PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY 
RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD WITH REFERENCE TO 
THE BLOCK USED IN THE SAID THEATER BY NOT 
OBJECtiNG TO THEIR USE AFTER KNOWING OF THE 
SAME. 
II 
PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE 
HAD WITH REFERENCE TO THE COURT'S FINDING 
OF A LACK OF MORTAR IN THE MASONRY AND IT 
WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO AWARD 
ANY DAMAGES FOR THE SAME. 
III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SIGNING THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT OF WILLIAM A. EARL AND WILLIAM A. 
EARL JR., THE PLASTERING SUBCONTRACTORS AND 
FURTHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SPECIFI· 
CALLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE SAID JUDGMENT, 
CONCLUSIONS AND FINDING PURSUANT TO DEFEND· 
ANT'S MOTION. 
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IV 
PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED SAID THEATER BUILD-
ING, TOOK POSSESSION OF THE SAME, PAID FOR 
THE SAME AND MADE NO OBJECTION OR COM-
PLAINTS, THEREFORE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY 
RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD AND IS NOW ESTOPPED 
FROM CLAIMING DAMAGES, AND IT WAS ERROR FOR 
THE LOWER COURT TO AWARD DAMAGES. 
v 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF HAD 
WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD AGAINST 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT HENRY L. ASHTON, THE 
MASONRY SUBCONTRACTORS, AND AGAINST WIL-
LIAM A. EARL AND WILLIAM A. EARL JR., THE PLAS-
TERING SUBCONTRACTORS. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANT USED A BUILDING STONE 
AND CINDER BLOCK DIFFERENT THAN THAT 
PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACT, FURTHER PLAIN-
TIFF WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE BLOCK USED IN THE 
SAID THEATER BY NOT OBJECTING TO THEIR 
USE AFTER KNOWING OF THE SAME. 
It is defendant's contention that the, "building stone 
and cinder block," as the court calls them, complied in 
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every respect to requirements of the plans and specifica· 
tions of the contract between plaintiff and defendant. Every 
bit of competent evidence submitted either by plaintiff's 
witnesses or defendant's demonstrated that the building blocks 
met the standards of the American Soci~ty for Testing Ma· 
terials as specified in the contract. (R 398, 401, 413, 474· 
476, 495, 496, 505, 511, 1054, 1055, 1133, 1134) 
The specifications as set forth in the contract state: 
(exh P-2, page 14) 
"HOLLOW CONCRETE MASONRY 
UNITS & MORTAR: 
"Hollow concrete blocks to comply with A.S.T.M. 
Specifications (latest issue.) To have minimum face 
shell thickness of 114" or over and to have a compres· 
sive strength of at least 700 lbs. per square inch over 
the average gross area for each unit. All units to be 
load hearing. Units to he medium textured." 
The blocks that were used in said theater were con· 
crete blocks made of the lightweight aggregate called pumice. 
(R 1168, 1243, 1244) It was plaintiff's contention that 
the only block that could be used according to the plans and 
specification was a block made of cement, sand and gravel. 
(R 404-431) In other words a block using a heavyweight 
aggregate. ( D-33, page 5) The pumice block used by de· 
fend ant is a block using a lightweight aggregate ( D-33, page 
5), however there can be no dispute that under the specifi· 
cations of the contract the lightweight aggregate, pumice 
block is authorized. 
Tests were made by the "Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory" 
to determine whether the blocks of the Richy Theater com· 
plied with the above requirements. Blocks were actually 
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removed from the theater walls and tested. The uncon-
tradicted evidence is that the blocks used in the theater ex-
ceed the requirements of the specifications and the A.S.T.M. 
Standards. (See D-62, 63) The A.S.T.M. standards and ac-
cordingly the specifications set up test for compressive 
strength and moisture content, (See P-28, D-32) and no 
others. 
The A.S.T.M. Standards state: D-32, 28 
"HOLLOW LOAD-BEARING CONCRETE 
MASONRY UNITS. 
Scope 
l. These specifications cover hollow load-bear-
ing concrete masonry wall units made from portland 
cement and suitable aggregates such as sand, gravel, 
crushed stone, bituminous or anthracite cinders, burned 
clay or shale, and blast-furnace slag." 
(The above is taken from page 626 of the hook 
A.S.T.M. Standards, 1949, exh. D.-32) 
According to the testimony of both Mr. Jean Driggs, 
the plaintiff's expert witness, and Mr. Robert Sanks, the 
defendant's expert witness, suitable aggregates for concrete 
blocks consist of heavyweight and lightweight aggregates. 
(R 236-256, 1054, 1055, 1133, 1134). See also Exh. P-36, 
P-35, P-29, at page 2, D-34, D-33 at page 15) According to 
A.S.T.M. Specifications the following are suitable light-
weight aggregates: (D-31) (page 720, of book, A.S.T.M. 
Standards, 1949) 
"LIGHTWEIGHT AGGREGATES FOR CON-
CRETE 
"Scope 
"1. These specifications cover lightweight aggre-
gates suitable for use in concrete. 
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"2. (a) Lightweight aggregates shall consist of 
pumice, lava, tufa, slag, burned clay, burned shale, cin-
ders derived from the high-temperature combustion of 
coal or coke showing a loss on ignition of not more 25 
percent ( 40 percent) 3, * * * . " 
There was no competent evidence to dispute the above 
evidence. Plaintiff produced a Mr. Paul Evans, a licensed 
architect, who prepared the plans and specifications for plain-
tiff, who testified over objection that a "HOLLOW CON-
CRETE MASONRY UNIT" does not cover a "HOLLOW 
CONCRETE BLOCK," therefore a blo.ck made of cement, 
sand and gravel was required under the plaintiff's contract. 
Further, that when he made up the specifications of plaintiff's 
contract he only intended that a block composed of cement, 
sand and gravel used. (R 404-431 incl.) How the lower 
court could make a finding, based upon this testimony, that 
defendant had not complied with the contract is absolutely 
without understanding. 
Both plaintiff and Mr. Paul Evans, the architect, who 
prepared the plans and specifications for the contract, were 
at said theater at the time the walls were being erected and 
neither of them objected to the type of block being used. 
(R 430, 365-367 incl.) And even after making an examina· 
tion of the masonry with respect to the joints and grouting 
and the separate agreement of January 7, 1950, being 
entered into, neither plaintiff nor Mr. Evans ever complained 
or objected to the type of block used. (R 365, 366, 367, 430) 
Plaintiff specifically testified at the trial that the only com· 
plaints he had, at the time of said agreement, were the ones 
contained in said agreement ( exh. P -5) . ( R 365, 366) If 
plaintiff had any rights he has waived them by his own action 
and conduct and is now estopped to claim any damages. 
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The following authorities are cited with reference to the 
question of waiver as set forth in defendant's arguments I, II, 
IV, V.: 
17 Corpus Juris Secundum page 1100, Contracts par. 
514 b, Building and Construction Contracts. "An accept-
ance of the work or structure, as in compliance with the con-
tract, will ordinarily constitute a waiver of a full performance 
or defective performance of a building contract and such 
acceptance may be expressed or implied from the conduct 
of the owner. Whether or not his acts amount to an accept-
ance is generally a question of fact depending on all the 
circumstances of the case. Thus, although particular circum-
stances in a given case may require a different holding some 
of the defects may be waived by the owner's failing to object 
thereto at the proper time, and specifically calling the build-
er's attention to other defects; hut a waiver of one defect is 
not a waiver of other defects. 
* * * * 
"(2) Occupancy or Use. Possession or use, however, 
is evidence of acceptance or waiver, and, when considered 
in connection with other circumstances, such as some act or 
some language on the part of the owner, may he sufficient 
to show an acceptance or acquiescence. * * * . " 
See also Sirch Electrical, etc., Laboratories v. Garbutt, 
110 P 140, 13 Cal App 435, where the court held that where 
there is acceptance, after knowledge of the defects, the owner 
is deemed to have waived the defects. 
Morgan v. Plotkin 189 N.W. 63, 219 Mich 265, where 
the court held that the owner of a building by his silence 
and apparent acquiescence with full knowledge of how the 
work was being done by a contractor for installing piping, 
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followed by his taking possession of and selling the property, 
in effect ratified and accepted the job, and cannot at a later 
time under changed conditions, to the disadvantage of the 
contractor seeking enforcement of a lien, be heard to com-
plain. 
Larsen v. Knight__ ______ u ________ , 233 P2d 365, 372, where 
the court stated: 
"Do these circumstances show such a situation and such 
conduct on the part of the plaintiffs as to justify the trial 
court's conclusion that the defendant was excused from his 
promise to install the ski tow. Do they amount to a waiver 
or estoppel? We believe they do. A party claiming a right 
ought not to appear to acquiesce in non-performance by the 
other party until the time has gone by for such performance 
and then claim damages. * * * . " 
Rehr v. West 76 N.E. 2d 808, 333 Ill App. 160, where 
the court held that the acceptance by the owner of a cement 
floor constructed by a contractor and the payment therefor 
constituted a waiver of all visible defects or such as could 
be ascertained by inspection and examination, but was not 
a waiver of latent defects. 
Leonard v. Home Builders, 174 Cal. 65, 161 P 1151, 
where the court held that payment is evidence to be con· 
sidered in the question of waiver. 
II 
PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY 
HAVE HAD WITH REFERENCE TO THE COURT'S 
FINDING OF A LACK OF MORTAR IN THE MA· 
SONRY AND IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER 
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COURT TO AWARD ANY DAMAGES FOR THE 
SAME. 
Approximately the first part of January 1950, prior to 
plaintiff taking possession of the said theater building, there 
arose some differences with reference to the construction of 
said building and as a result plaintiff and defendant and 
defendant's subcontractor, Third Party Defendant Henry L. 
Ashton entered into a separate agreement. Prior thereo plain-
tiff and his architect, Mr. Paul Evans, had been on the con-
struction site, examined the building and the masonry work. 
As a result thereof the agreement of January 7, 1950, was 
entered into which is as follows: 
"Mr. Alvie Peterson 
1241 Whitlock Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
"Dear Sir: 
January 7, 1950 
"In accordance with our discussion with you and Mr. 
Evans, your architect and as was verbally agreed at that 
meeting, we propose to thoroughly point up and fill all mason-
ry joints in the exterior of the hollow block masonry work on 
your theatre at 838 West North Temple. We also propose 
to paint these walls with a heavy coat of lead and oil paint. 
"This work is to he done in full compensation for our 
failure to install certain items of steel, in the hollow block 
pilasters and walls, in a satisfactory manner, also for our 
failure to fill pilaster cores with cement mortar and to com-
pletely bed vertical block joints as shown and specified. 
"Accepted : 
"/s/ Alvie Peterson 
"Date 1-10-50 
"(See Exh. P-5)" 
/s/ Henry L. Ashton 
/s/ Roydon K. McCullough 
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At the time of the signing of the agreement of January 
7, 1950, the masonry work was just about completed. Plain-
tiff estimated it about two-thirds complete, but immediately 
thereafter the masonry was completed. (R 366, 367) Plain· 
tiff visited the premises on an average of twice a day, in-
spected the work, and when it came time to do the painting 
of the exterior walls, in accordance with said January 7th 
agreement, plaintiff selected the color of the paint to be used 
and was present when at least part of the wall was being 
painted. Plaintiff at no time complained or objected to the 
way in which the paint was applied or that the joints had not 
been properly filled or tooled or pointed up, according to the 
agreement of January 7, 1950. (R 340-345 incl., 1291, 281, 
308) 
Further, on the 19th of April 1951, more than one 
year after the building had been turned over to plaintiff, 
plaintiff requested defendant to submit a hid on an addi· 
tional portion of the building. Even at that time, more than 
a year later, plaintiff made no objection or complaint with 
reference to the construction of the said building. (R 334, 
341,845) 
Defendant and his subcontractor went to additional ex-
pense to satisfy plaintiff. Plaintiff was present twice a day, 
saw the work being performed, examined it, had his architect 
examine it, allowed defendant and his subcontractor to pro· 
ceed with the construction, and now plaintiff complains and 
is awarded damages for the very elements that plaintiff ac· 
quiesced in. Plaintiff waived his rights, if he had any, and 
he is now estopped to claim injury and damages and the 
lower court should have refused the same. 
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III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SIGNING THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT OF WILLIAM A. EARL AND WILLIAM 
A. EARL JR., THE PLASTERING SUBCONTRACT-
ORS AND FURTHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED, 
IN SPECIFICALLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE SAID 
JUDGMENT, CONCLUSIONS, AND FINDINGS PUR-
SUANT TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION. 
At the conclusion of the evidence and after the parties 
had rested, motions were made on behalf of the Third Party 
Defendants for dismissal of Third Party Defendant's com-
plaint. The court denied the motions of Ashton and Earls, 
however, with respect to the motion of Third Party Defend-
ant Buehner Cinder Block, the court granted their motion 
for dismissal. At that time counsel for Third Party Plain-
tiff cited to the court our Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54 
(b), pertaining to judgment being entered upon multiple 
claims. Said rule is as follows: 
"(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. When 
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, a final judgment may be entered upon one 
or more but less than all of the claims only upon an 
express determination by the court that there is no 
just reason for delay and upon an express direction 
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of 
decision, however designated, which adjudicates less 
than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to 
any of the claims, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims." 
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Thereupon the court specifically ordered that judgment 
would not be entered upon any of the claims until such time 
as it was entered on all of the claims at the same time. The 
express order of the court is set forth in full in defendant's 
statement of fact and is therefore not repeated here. Not· 
withstanding the foregoing, the court, in absolute derogation 
of Third Party Plaintiff's rights, on August 12, 1954 entered 
judgment for the Earls. No notice was given either by the 
court or counsel for the Earls that the judgment had been 
entered. It was not until approximately two months later, 
that counsel for Third Party Plaintiff was advised that judg· 
ment for the Earls had been signed two months before. Third 
Party Plaintiff relied upon the express order of the court 
and the integrity of the court and had a right to rely thereon, 
and Third Party Defendant should not be prejudiced on his 
appeal by such action. 
Third Party Defendant immediately filed with the court 
a motion objecting to the court signing anymore judgments, 
and specifically the plaintiffs, and asked that the judgment 
of the Earls be vacated. The court, however, signed the 
plaintiff's judgment, and defendant filed another motion to 
have plaintiff's judgment vacated until judgment could he 
entered on all of the claims at the same time. On the 9th 
of November 1954, the court heard the above motions and 
denied the same. 
Certainly, based upon such a record of procedure Third 
Party Plaintiffs appeal with respect to the judgment of Third 
Party Defendant Earl should not be prejudiced by failing 
to appeal within the one month period from the date of 
entry of judgment. 
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The findings, conclusions and judgment of Third Party 
Defendant Buehner Cinder Block Company were never 
signed or filed by the court until after notice of appeal had 
been filed with this court. The predicament, in which the 
lower court placed Third Party Plaintiff is manifestly unfair. 
IV 
PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED SAID THEATER 
BUILDING, TOOK POSSESSION OF THE SAME, 
PAID FOR THE SAME AND MADE NO OBJECTION 
OR COMPLAINTS, THEREFORE PLAINTIFF HAS 
WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE HAD AND 
IS NOW ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING DAMAGES, 
AND IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO 
AWARD DAMAGES. 
It is defendant's contention that if plaintiff had any 
rights, with reference to defects in said building, or unsuit-
able and inferior materials being used, that he has by his 
conduct and actions, acquiescsed in the same, and waived 
any rights he may have had. The following facts are undis-
puted: 
1. That on April 13, 1950, defendant turned said the-
ater building over to plaintiff and plaintiff examined and 
took possession of the same and commenced his theater 
operation without making objection or complaint to de-
fendant. ( R 835, 320-327) 
2. That the contract provides that final payment shall 
be made within ten days after substantial completion. Final 
payment was made by plaintiff at the time of taking pos-
session of the said building, by plaintiff issuing to defend-
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ant a promissory note for $,1,000.00, the final balance owing 
on said contract, and which note was finally paid in full by 
plaintiff to defendant personally on March 1, 1951. (R 837, 
838, 839) 
3. At the time of the signing of the agreement of Jan· 
uary 7, 1950, the masonry work was just about completed. 
Plaintiff estimated it about two-thirds complete, but imme-
diately thereafter the masonry was completed, and defendant 
specifically testified that he had no other complaints or ob-
jections, other than those specified in the said agreement. 
(R 365-367) 
4. Plaintiff visited the premises on an average of twice 
a day, inspected the work, and testified that he had experience 
in the building business. ( R 355, 326) 
5. When it came time to do the painting required in 
the agreement of January 7, 1950, plaintiff selected the color 
of the paint to be used and was present when at least part of 
the wall was being painted. Plaintiff at no time complained 
or objected to the way in which the paint was applied or that 
the joints had not been properly filled or tooled or pointed 
up, or that there were any other defects. (R 340-345 incl., 
1291, 281, 308) 
6. Further, on the 19th of April 1951, more than one 
year after the building had been turned over to plaintiff, 
plaintiff requested defendant to submit a bid on an addi· 
tional portion of the building. Even at that time, more than 
a year later, plaintiff made no objection or complaint with 
reference to the construction of said theater building. {R 334, 
341, 845) 
If plaintiff had any rights certainly he has waived the 
same by his own conduct and action. 
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v 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY PLAIN-
TIFF HAD WAIVED ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE 
HAD AGAINST THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
HENRY L. ASHTON, THE MASONRY SUBCON-
TRACTOR, AND AGAINST WILLIAM A. EARL AND 
WILLIAM A. EARL JR., THE PLASTERING SUB-
CONTRACTORS. 
The lower court in its findings of facts, conclusions and 
judgment in favor of the Third Party Defendants stated that 
Third Party Plaintiff accepted and approved the work of the 
subcontractors, paid for the same, made no objection thereto, 
and therefore waived any claim he may have had. 
Defendant, in his third party complaint, alleged that 
plaintiff was suing him for breach of the original contract, 
incorporated plaintiff's complaint as a part of his own com-
plaint, alleged that Third Party Defendants, as subcontrac-
tors, agreed to construct a portion of said building and to 
do so in accordance with the plans and specifications of the 
original contract between plaintiff and defendant, and prayed 
that if the court found for plaintiff on any portion of the 
construction work which the subcontractors had agreed to 
perform, then and in such case defendant have judgment 
against said subcontractors in the same amount as plaintiff 
was awarded judgment. Third Party Defendants admitted 
that they agreed to do the work in accordance with the plans 
and specifications of the original contract between plaintiff 
and defendant. 
Third Party Plaintiff, in his entire case, attempted to 
show that in truth and fact there were no defects in said build-
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ing and no unsuitable materials or defective workmanship, 
and that said building was built according to the specifica-
tions and the changes agreed to by plaintiff. 
With reference to the building blocks Third Party Plain-
tiff testified that because, under the specifications, different 
types of aggregates could be used in the blocks he. and 
Third Party Defendant Ashton contacted plaintiff and it was 
agreed that a block containing a lightweight aggregate was 
to be used and the pumice block was selected. Third Party 
Defendant Ashton confirmed this conversation. ( R 852, 
1243-1248). 
There is no question that Third Party Plaintiff accepted 
the work of the subcontractors, made no objection thereto and 
paid them for the same. The same factors are present in 
plaintiff's case. The plaintiff accepted and took possession 
of the building, paid for it and made no objection thereto, 
yet the court found in one case that Third Party Plaintiff 
by such conduct waived his rights, however, under the same 
set of circumstances the plaintiff does not waive anything. 
The result would appear to be somewhat incongruous. 
The Third Party Plaintiff, as set forth in his complaint, 
relied upon the evidence of plaintiff. The only evidence sub· 
mitted by defendant was in defense of plaintiff's case and 
the court ruled against him. Under such a set of circum· 
stances the court would also have to find against the subcon· 
tractors. 
With reference to the plastering of the said theater build· 
ing, the court held that there was defective plaster used, 
which therefore required that the building be replastered. 
The only basis upon which the court could say that plaintiff 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
had not waived his rights would be that the defective plaster 
presented a latent defect which was not discoverable by rea-
sonable inspection. The testimony of plaintiff, on cross 
examination by counsel for the Earls, was to the effect that 
the cracking in the plaster did not commence to appear until 
July of 1951, i.e., after the building had passed through an 
entire summer and winter. (R 360, 361) If such is to be 
the basis upon which the lower court bases its finding, then 
surely the same finding must pertain as between defendant 
and his subcontractor. The fact that no defects appeared 
until a year and a half after plaintiff took possession of the 
building bears out defendant's testimony that he accepted 
the plaster work approved it and paid for it. Defendant 
would have no reason not to accept it. If a latent defect, 
which did not appear until over a year after plaintiff took 
possession would prevent a waiver of plaintiff's rights, cer-
tainly the same latent defect would preclude the subcontractor 
from saying that defendant had waived his rights. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that the judg-
ment of the lower court, with respect to the defendant and 
plaintiff should be reversed and it should be held that plain-
tiff by reason of his conduct and actions has waived any 
rights that he may have had. However, in the event, this court 
decides that plaintiff's judgment should not be reversed, 
then this court should hold that defendant's subcontractor 
Henry L. Ashton and William A. Earl and William A. Earl 
Jr., are liable for that portion of the damages attributable 
to them and the lower court sitting as trier of fact should 
be instructed to apportion the damages found in Plaintiff's 
judgment between Ashton and Ear Is. 
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Further, with respect to the building blocks, the judg-
ment of the lower court should be reversed on the ground 
that the competent undisputed evidence demonstrates without 
question that the building blocks are within the requirements 
of the specifications. 
Respectfully submitted 
McCuLLOUGH, BoYCE AND McCuLLOUGH 
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